Weakness is a quality frequently ascribed to Latin American states. This diagnosis proves faulty since it is possible to find resistant structures inside those states that perpetuate such weaknesses. This article shows that this is the case in regards to the police force of the province of Buenos Aires. Here, I will demonstrate that the police have specialized in selling a service available to criminals and criminal organizations: illegal protection. With information taken from in-depth interviews and official documents, I will show that this protection -contrary to the views of Charles Tilly and Diego Gambetta -is characterized by a temporary suspension of the rule of law.
Introduction
There is a relative consensus in academia about which Latin American states should be labelled "weak". Advocates of this perspective highlight the insufficient capacity of control, government and action of these states. In terms of internal security, this feature is manifested by the police institutions' inability to provide adequate protection to citizens. Even without entering into a discussion about the idea of weakness, the diagnosis of state fragility shows only one aspect of the phenomenon. The "fragile" quality cannot be explained but by the "strength" of highly stable structures, which actually perpetuate the aforementioned weakness. Therefore, the persistence of high rates of crime and corruption suggest the existence of police organizations remarkably resistant to reform.
Based on recent research on mafias, 1 this article analyses the robustness of police structures in so-called "weak states". These organizations, which have a great capacity to resist reform, make a chronic problem of the deficiencies relating to the exercise of monopoly of state violence by the police. In this article, I will argue that this strength is based on the constant trading of a service -namely, protection. This service is offered to individuals and/or criminal groups as merchandise or goods, and it consists of a momentary abrogation of the law. In other words, we are referring to police organizations that, while offering protection, indirectly create the conditions for the emergence of insecurity. Paradoxically, these organizations produce insecurity in order to achieve a demand for security.
In his book about the Sicilian mafia, 2 Diego Gambetta tried to prove that protection -a piece of merchandise traded by the state, according to Charles Tilly -can also be offered by mafia organizations. While Tilly analysed state protection, Gambetta studied mafia protection. This article complicates the issue a bit more and presents a combination of both approaches. The idea is to show that some state police organizations offer illegal protection and thus inject the trust needed for the illegal exchange of certain goods and services.
The result of this combination is a particular type of protection whose sale stimulates the operation of certain illegal markets. Police participation in those informal commercial spaces entails both a blockade of legal rules and regulations and a paradoxical dependence on the latter.
This paper focuses on a state agency, the police force. I will attempt to demonstrate how that force, through the sale of illegal protection, offers a relatively safe and predictable environment for certain economic exchanges. In order to do this, I will start with a conceptual discussion of the notion of protection. I will identify three variants of protection: the one offered by the state, the one offered by mafia organizations, and the one illegally offered by the police. Once I have pointed out the characteristics of this merchandise, in the second part of this report I will address the following question: Should the sale of illegal protection be seen as the result of a certain type of institutional operation or just as a deviant behaviour? The matter at hand is not simple because what we are actually trying to determine is whether the problem lies in the police institution or in the individual officers. In this section I will demonstrate that the relation between the police and politics creates an institutional dynamic that stimulates the sale of illegal protection. This may mainly be due to the institution's financing deficits, but also to the normalization of corrupt activities.
3 Just as with any product, the fact 1 Here, reference is made to the research line initiated by Gambetta, Diego (1996) 2 Gambetta, Diego, op. cit.
3 The normalization of corrupt activities within the police force should be understood as a triple process which consists of the institutionalization of certain practices, their subsequent rationalization or ideological justification and their socialization, as they become permissible if not desirable; see: Ashforth, Blake E., and Vikas Anand of protection being on the market does not necessarily mean that such a product will be purchased. For that reason, in the third part of this article I will show that the obtaining of information and the reputation of policemen as protectors are two resources that ensure the acquisition of protection. I will then go on in the fourth part of the article to describe the specific forms of protection, focusing especially on the stolen vehicle market in Greater Buenos
Aires. The empirical evidence allows us to identify three forms of protection: the release of areas where police surveillance is deliberately suspended, the detention and release of persons, and the provision of benefits in exchange for information. Even though it might be argued that the circumstances that keep this market in good health are beyond the reach of the police, we will see that the role of the police force is vital, and this justifies talking about a specific type of protection. After describing the different forms of protection, I will refer to a decisive question whose answer distinguishes the police force from the mafia in their role as suppliers of protection: the possibility of producing and falsifying official documents.
Throughout the different sections of this article it will become clear that the police force of the province of Buenos Aires, in connivance with the local political power, has specialized in the sale of three types of protection that are readily available to criminals and criminal organizations. In order for the police to be able to sell protection, two elements are essential:
1) every police station requires information-production mechanisms, and 2) policemen must maintain their reputation as illegal protectors.
This study sheds light on the phenomenon of the clandestine relationship between state and non-state actors, the periodical appearance of organized violence, and public security issues.
In order to address each of these issues, I will provide empirical evidence on the police force of the province of Buenos Aires (from the first attempt at reform in 1997 up until the present), focusing on the theft and re-sale of vehicles and auto parts. These pieces of evidence were gathered over the course of three research stays, 4 the first one from December 2009 to January 2010, and the second and third in April and July 2010, respectively.
4 Since doing research in the field of illegal police protection demanded shedding light on a reality in which information can be elusive, the collection of data required a specific strategy. A first, exploratory phase of interviews with (former) public officers, representatives of different entities and/or companies and journalists, and a bibliographic review of academic and journalistic literature was then followed by a phase of focused interviews and a search for specific documents. It was during this last phase that I had access to valuable public files, and the chance to evaluate them with former officers of the Ministry of Security of the province. That, in addition to a critical attitude towards the documentary sources, was necessary, taking into consideration that the administrative proceedings within a police institution are frequently used for extortive or informal disciplinary purposes. To collect information according to pre-established criteria (years, zones, hierarchies, etc.) was not possible for two reasons: First, due to the reluctance of the current authorities (in 2010) of the General Audit of Internal Affairs to offer access to public information. Second, due to the lamentable and total absence of official statistics concerning public security issues. did not contradict one another and were coherent, I triangulated the information whenever possible with official documents, other interviews, and/or journalistic information. The same procedure was followed for the rest of the interviews.
The Nature of Illegal Police Protection
In the town of Wilde, province of Buenos Aires, Elbio Oscar Fernández ran a company for sixteen years dedicated to stealing vehicles, taking them apart, and selling the parts. The nickname by which he became known, El Rey del Corte (the "Cut-Up King"), should probably be attributed to the success of his business. This businessman managed to build an infrastructure consisting of 11 establishments, each with its own supplier, goods in stock, buyers who were offered a personalized service, and employees, many of whom were Fernández' relatives. 6 Undoubtedly, the complex logistical operations required to manage the theft and 5 I conducted 21 interviews. The great majority of them were in-depth interviews, and, whenever it was possible and/or necessary to consult the interviewee again, the interviews were pre-structured. Only a few interviews could be recorded; in the majority of the cases the interviewee did not give his/her consent, and in some cases the conditions of the dialogue did not allow it. The persons interviewed were a former minister of the These two cases exemplify a phenomenon that goes beyond mere corruption or deviant behaviour, as typically defined in many recent studies about the police forces of Latin America.
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On the contrary, as I will attempt to show, we are referring to true joint enterprises whose operation depends on a single factor: police protection.
Up to now, protection has been analysed from the perspective of two providers: a legal one, the state, and an extra-legal one, the mafia. With the process of the formation of the modern state as a backdrop, Tilly defines protection as "the elimination or neutralization of the enemies of the state makers' clients". 10 That is to say, to be allowed to trade and collect taxes, to be protected against attacks, etc., comes in exchange for providing the state with the resources that ensure the submission of citizens. Bandits, pirates and criminals had a prominent role during state-building processes, and also received protection from the holders of power, as long as their services allowed them to guarantee the resources needed to make war. Eventually, the progressive autonomization of the state sphere created a precise frontier between two fields: the first, a legal one, where client-citizens built their trust networks in the heat of state protection in return for different resources, and the second, an extra-legal one, threatened by the state's predatory power. 11 According to this perspective, protection is of- fered as a means to ensure the extraction of resources, to create a state monopoly, and to wage war against opponents.
As Diego Gambetta and others have demonstrated, when the state cannot protect its clients effectively and provide the trust needed for economic exchanges, an extra-legal player like the mafia can assume the role of provider of protection. In an environment characterized by distrust, the fact of being protected has a special meaning since it is a singular lubricant for economic transactions. By hiring mafia protection, it is possible to purchase and sell goods in a safe way, to dissuade or get rid of potential competitors, to secure clients, and to avoid being swindled. In other words, protection is a desired asset.
Even when transaction costs are high and competition gets distorted, threats to security justify the purchase of protection. But, unlike the state, the criminal character of this sui generis protection structure and its structural characteristics prevent a universalization of the provisions. 12 It is important to note, however, that both types of protection -state and criminal -tend to neutralize or eliminate people and specific groups.
A third type of protection takes shape when 1) there is a state police organization that does not neutralize or eliminate the enemies of those clients that provide resources to build the state, and 2) the one who sells illegal protection is not the mafia but a state agency. The clients of the state included within the official tax system are referred to as "clients that provide resources" to the state.
This clarification is necessary given that, as already pointed out, 13 the policeʹs sale of illegal protection to criminals also aims to extract resources to maintain and help build the state. 14 If criminals, and those who are not criminals, are regarded as clients of the state, we could appreciate the particularity of this phenomenon: the state, through the police force, provides protection to two clients -criminals and ordinary individuals -whose interests are opposed.
The main characteristic of the police protection analysed here is the one that aims to prevent formal rules from being efficient. While from Tilly's or Gambetta's perspectives, protection is directed towards people or specific groups, the kind of protection referred to here is meant to suspend the application of the law 15 and create spaces with a sui generis internal regulation. 16 The police organization addressed in this work protects both the individuals and certain criminal groups. In other words, it renders the law ineffective and turns this "service" into merchandise. If this definition of illegal police protection is correct, we may more clearly perceive a dimension of state weakness. Such weakness will consist of an active de facto abrogation of formal regulations that is afterwards sold to ordinary individuals as a product in different markets, such as the stolen vehicle market, the human-trafficking market and the drug-trafficking market. In other words, the illegal police protection industries appear when a de facto privatization of public security, which enables the provision of a coveted merchandise -private protection -can be verified. These industries not only provide effective protection to criminal organizations but also to citizens willing to pay for a momentary abrogation of the law.
Although the sale of protection and the sale of inaction 17 bear some similarities, we should make a clear distinction between them in order to avoid confusion. If a police officer charges a certain amount of money to a driving offender (rather than applying the official fine), inaction and protection seem equal: Protection from the law is offered through inac-
tion. Yet, other situations make us treat both categories in a differentiated way, creating an analytical division between them. An example of that would be when a police officer refrains from taking action in order to create a specific demand for protection; for instance, when a shopkeeper who, in retaliation for his refusal to pay "additional contributions" to be protected, suffers police inaction, then falls victim to a crime, and is thus indirectly compelled to require the previously rejected protection. Here, inaction generates a demand for protection.
Lastly, another strong reason to make a distinction between inaction and protection is that the latter is carried out in an active way. To put it differently, inaction does not entail "not doing anything". A clear example of this is the creation of the so-called zonas liberadas (areas where police surveillance is deliberately suspended). To give protection to Elbio Fernández by ending police patrols in a determined area is an active inaction, given that it entails coordination, alteration of records, etc.
Lastly, another particularity of this type of protection is that its provider -the police forcehas a monopoly over it. Since being protected means being above the law, the one able to offer this product is a state agent. It is, therefore, an illegal protection that differs from that provided by the mafia, which only gets to control the market through cartels. 18 The implications of this variant of illegal protection are far-reaching since, as we will see, the policeunlike mafia organizations -do not compete with other suppliers and, consequently, do not bother to gather information about their clients or potential competitors, or to see to the purity of the economic transactions of their clients. 19 By being a monopoly, the main source of insecurity is not the possible loss of clients, but the virtual lack of bureaucratic coordination between legal and illegal activities. As a result, the police place their efforts on administrative coordination issues with the aim of potentially meeting the accountability demanded by the judiciary or the media. 20 The compatibilization of illegal activities -through the falsification of official records -relocates a considerable amount of organizational resources and calls for the creation of new sources of information, such as armed operations or illegal detentions. 21
To sum up, police protection may come in one of two forms: one that complies with the characteristics of Tilly's perspective, that is to say, protection against the enemies of the clients of the state, and the other one, which is offered illegally and acts as a shield, isolating state power. Certain businesses or enterprises that would normally encounter state hostility have the chance to prosper under this protective shield. The fact that this second type of protection is both illegal and provided by the police force stems from the role served by those who offer it: we are not referring to state agents or mafiosi that defend the interests of their organizations, but to agents who send signals in both directions.
Organizing Illegal Police Protection
While I was conducting my fieldwork, a high government official of the province of Buenos Aires from whom I was hoping to obtain information about the Ministry of Security said, in response to a comment of mine, "When one speaks with the mayors, one has the feeling that what they say about illegal financing and the relationship with chief officers does not exist." One could hardly prove the truthfulness of that statement, but in any case it serves to formulate an essential question: Was the protection enjoyed by the "Cut-Up King", for example, an elaborated product resulting from a particular institutional dynamic or was it merely an isolated example of corrupt behaviour? Or, in other words, is there an organized sale of illegal protection coordinated within the police force, or are there just particular police officers that take advantage of certain situations for their own profit? 21 On the phenomenon of illegal detentions as a means of production of bureaucratic information, there is a con- To answer those questions, we must determine the existing degree of coordination inside the police force aimed at the production and sale of illegal protection. This is no different to the case of any other company because it could be accepted that the determined end products of a textile company also result from the coordination of a series of stages and processes. On the contrary, if the existence of an internal level of organization cannot be proven, we should speak about an isolated case of sale of protection, with no institutional correlate, attributable to deviant behaviour.
Before showing the information gathered in the interviews referring to this matter, I will address an issue present in specialized literature without which it would be impossible to approach the main topic of this section: the relationship between the police and politics. The idea that I will develop further below is the possibility that certain geographical areas, people or flows of transport may be protected based on an institutional dynamic that promotes the sale of protection.
The authors that have addressed this issue found that the logic of police operations in Argentina is not novel and that its origin dates back to the end of nineteenth century. by auto-regulating the instances of contact with the latter.
But even now that this instrumental link between politics and the police has been demonstrated, the specialized academic literature does not seem to probe further. Little has been written about the motives that lead both police officers and politicians to sustain such reciprocity. This question is valid, above all, because maintaining this relationship means that politicians risk losing their public reputation or political capital, and police chiefs risk losing their posts. The argument that I would like to introduce, based on gathered empirical material, is that the reciprocity pact is sustained by the possibility of the regulation of certain illegal markets. The economic chances offered by these markets and the possibility of regulating their operation stimulate and keep the previously mentioned politics-police link alive. There is a reason to partner. In other words, the risk implied in being involved in this politicalpolice affair is compensated for by the extraction of resources from specific markets, most of which are illegal. In this context, protection is the merchandise par excellence that serves to constantly suck resources, to regulate the "actors of crime", and to keep the ties between politicians and police chiefs tight.
A report on the results of the tenure of former Minister of Justice and Security of Buenos Aires Carlos Arslanián states that the budget of the initial phase of his second period in power was deficient. That implied, according to that report, a lack of information systems, insufficient material resources, absence of purchases -for equipment, clothing, communications and computing purposes, etc. -a lack of both a purchase policy and an infrastructure mean that the sale of protection, by means of which the illegal markets are exploited and regulated, is an answer to the lack of infrastructure and necessary resources? The answer, which I will expand on later in this paper, is yes. Lack of resources as the main cause of the sale of protection is arguable, especially when we could be facing a political activism that favours this state of affairs. Yet, according to the information collected, a satisfactory explanation alluding to a double-conditioning may be offered. On the one hand, we have to consider police definancing and, on the other hand, the political activism expressed through the federal institutional architecture that reinforces the status quo.
In the course of an interview, Supervision Officer Carlos referred to the financing subject:
"You see, we are in April [2010] and all the police stations of the province have been waiting since last October for the petty cash money to arrive. 29 I say this so you have an idea of the financing question. I don't want to justify the things that are done, but this is to have a more global view. Look, a police officer, a low-ranking one, is currently working 8 normal hours. Four CORES, 6 additional hours, if they are paid, and that gives you a total of 3,600 pesos. And you are out of your house all day for that dough, which today is not enough for anything."
While Carlos alluded to a debt that jeopardizes the minimum operation of a police station, Marcelo Saín proposed an exercise that clearly demonstrates the problem:
"There is a huge budgetary deficit. The police force of Buenos Aires has 55,000 men, and when people want more security they ask for more policemen.
[…] If one day the police force stopped illicitly collecting money, [that is to say] they didn't get anything from anywhere or anyone, then [the force] may be able to operate for only the first ten days of a month."
If the first condition/incentive arises out of these budgetary and structural deficits, the federal institutional design is the second factor. It acts as a corset that delimits the transactions between the police force and politics and promotes the sale of protection. 30 In this federal scheme, the power held by mayors at the municipal level is used to exert influence on the decisions adopted in terms of policing at the provincial level. According to the interviewees, the police situation in the province of Buenos Aires cannot be explained without alluding to the figure of the mayor and the role that he plays in the appointment and maintenance of chief Through this example we can observe a usual mechanism whose centre of gravity is the mayor's electoral power. Thanks to that, the departmental chief has the chance to indirectly press the provincial authorities. In that way, not only does he keep his job, but he also has the chance to take part in the commercial opportunities that the area of San Eusebio offers him.
On the other hand, the actions taken by Mr. Cardinal are explained by his own need, as is well put by Eaton, "to derive substantial funds from the illicit conduct of police officers, funds that are useful in hard-fought and increasingly expensive political campaigns". 33 In that sense:
"During campaign times there is an increase in crime because the police let the rackets do their work. Letting their businesses run is a means for politicians to raise money during campaign times. That is the reason why at that time there is also a decrease in drug seizures; there is a need to sell. The deal for the mayor is to win money that is then passed on to the chief officer. And it is also meant for other things. For instance, to leave the punteros [neighbourhood brokers] free to commit armed robberies. The punteros work for the mayor during the day and at night they commit armed robberies."
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As shown by evidence, this political-police joint venture is based on the constant absorption of resources generated by the sale of protection, which are used to cover different financing needs: political campaigns, the lack of resources at the police institution, and the illicit enrichment of police chiefs and politicians. 35 However, the fact that police officers and politicians form an alliance for convenience does not mean that they both participate in the same way. That is to say, in terms of the production of protection, one must make a distinction between the protection provided by the police and the other type of protection, a more diffuse protection, by the way, provided by politicians.
32 Interview with Carlos.
33 Kent Eaton, op. cit., 19.
34 Interview with Carlos.
35 Interviews with Arslanian, Naldini.
There are three reasons to maintain that distinction: The first one is that police protection is a requirement of police autonomy. Such autonomy is expressed by the fact that the police force defines its own duties and institutional goals; it also establishes the guidelines of public security. Here, autonomy also means that the police have developed informal institutional mechanisms that aim to achieve a parallel self-financing. Similar to any kind of modern enterprise, we find ourselves before an organization whose structure -from the community police station up to the police headquarters in the city of La Plata -is fed by resources gained from the sale of illegal protection. At the same time, those circuits are replicated in the rest of the police structure:
"The policemen that collect money […] . I mean the ones that really collect it, no bull- These guys change everything."
A second difference between political and police protection stems from the auto-financing logic. Its immediate consequence is that the police forceʹs institutional behaviour ends up being similar to that of a company. An example of this behaviour is that the political protection needed by the police is obtained by means of lobbying activities. In other words, in order to sell police protection, it is necessary to obtain political protection.
Similar to the interest groups at the time of political elections, the police force in question does not pursue a particular result aside from influencing government security policies. 39 For those who want to see this as an act of extortion committed by the police, it is important to point out that this behaviour does not differ from that of legal organizations. If we consider, for instance, the pharmaceutical industry or a powerful trade union, we will see that their actions, which are meant to influence public politics and create a normative framework to protect their own interests, do not analytically differ from those of the police. This leads us to observe that police protection as merchandise is different from political protection, in the same way as the sale of an antibiotic is distinguished from the policies that protect the pharmaceutical sector.
Third, the protections differ from one another on a very basic level, which has to do with contact with the public. As I will illustrate in the following text, those who take part in illegal businesses maintain a relationship with the police but not with politicians. The sale of nonenforcement, not only to criminals but also to citizens who are willing to pay for such merchandise, is made by the police, and it is that force that manages both the amount to be charged and the form of sale.
To sum up, even though police protection is closely linked to politics, the two need to be clearly differentiated. Police autonomy has caused the institutionʹs organizational behaviour to resemble that of a company that works to generate its own resources through the sale of guarantees of protection. 
Resources for the Protection Sale
In the preceding section we saw that the sale of protection arises as an inner requirement of the police force and that it must not be interpreted as mere corruption or as a collection of isolated deviant behaviours. By means of the sale of protection, the police provide a nonenforcement that results in the creation of protected areas in which rights have no importance. In this way, as we have already seen, the state sells protection twice: once for the citizens, who supply resources through taxes, and once for criminals, who pay to be able to work in illegal markets.
However, even though the police provide said protection, this does not mean that the venture will succeed. As well as with the supply of legal protection, in which the state must prove to is citizens that its ambitions to collect taxes from it are legitimate, 40 (otherwise it must prove its ability to impose itself), in the case of illegal protection the police must show guarantees to the world of illegality. The police must be illegally believable. Whenever the criminals see in the police a reliable source of protection and the threat of extra-legal force is appropriate, the purchase of protection will be guaranteed. 41 As is clear from this, it is not enough to state that the police sell illegal protection; it is also important to establish the factors to guarantee that sale. nel's case is that, after he was preventively discharged, he continued his duties as chop shop collector. Coronel kept "working" for the DDI and, in his own words, the reason for his staying was that to his "bosses" he was the only trustworthy person.
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The issue that I am going to deal with here comes from the striking fact that Officer
Coronel "kept working" because to his "bosses" he was a trustworthy person. Indeed, this event shows that Coronel was not a regular policeman and that his job was important for two reasons: The first one is that Coronel had exclusive information about the area and its inhabitants. 47 This unique territorial information as well as the fact that he was a police officer gave him a particular negotiation power with the chop shop owners, but also within the police station (to fight for his job). The second reason is that, as a result of that information,
Coronel became effective and trustworthy -that is to say, he gained a reputation of being a protector, an attribute essential for any organization that pretends to sell those types of commodities. 48 Next, I will point out that the success of selling illegal protection requires that 1) the police develop sensible mechanisms to acquire information, and that 2) police officers maintain their reputation in the eyes of both the police force and the criminals.
When these factors are present, police protection circulates and crime can be controlled informally. And as Gambetta agrees, the dimensions complement each other because the "ability to gather information is part of the prestige". In this underworld where there are few certainties, the permanent demand of reliability makes information a precious commodity. Anyone who has good information can act in an environment that he considers to be reliable and foresee successful businesses. For that reason, the role of the informant, or buchón ("snitch"), an authentic dealer of information, becomes extremely important.
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Nevertheless, the main means of information-gathering that the police stations in Greater Buenos Aires have is the so-called "street service", a group of four or five policemen whose job is to go around their jurisdiction all day long. 51 All the accumulated knowledge of the police stations about the territory comes from this group being in touch with neighbours, shopkeepers, businessmen, public employees, and criminals, as well as the police officers' personal history. To give an example, many of them having been born in shantytowns "know where the cocaine kitchens are". 52 Street service, then, by being the first line of contact with the criminals, is an essential stage in the process of protection sale. There, prices and sale conditions are set, possible reprisals are communicated, and strategic information is given, such as opening and closing hours of local shops or possible controls from other state organisms.
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Using official information for criminal purposes makes street service a significant aspect in the manipulation of available information. The monopolistic position of the police implies that the street service does not specialize in verifying the purity of the transactions or in gathering exhaustive information about the clients. To a certain extent, it is not relevant for the police if their clients swindle or are swindled, as it is also not important to gather personal information about these clients. This is the case because the police, unlike the mafia groups described by Gambetta, do not need to defend themselves from competitors. That is why, for the 50 Interview with Carlos.
51 Interviews with Carlos, Naldini, Saín, Arslanián.
52 Interviews with Carlos, Arslanián. purpose of selling illegal protection, it is not necessary to use mechanisms of criminal intelligence 54 and it is only necessary to verify, as we shall see, the criminals' affordability.
However, when the police legally investigate the operations of criminal organizations, a series of evidence or clues are found that must be controlled constantly to confirm its veracity.
In the case of selling illegal protection, the same problem comes up: the reliability of the information given by criminals must be controlled. In other words, how can the police protect themselves from useless information? In regards to this issue, the police officer with exhaustive knowledge about the area and its inhabitants again plays an essential role. The sale of useless information by criminals can be avoided by implying that one (the police officer) has greater and better information, that is to say, that otherwise you are getting into risky business. Due to this deterrent mechanism, it is understood that at first the police will accept all sorts of information and then evaluate the reliability of their partners. The second reason for which Officer Coronel had the confidence of his bosses was his reputation. This, as Gambetta points out, "refers to the quality and reliability that is expected from goods or a businessman and acts as a guide for buyers". 58 The reputation problem of the police officer of Buenos Aires is unusual and differs clearly from other types of reputations, such as that of a member of the mafia or a public officer who performs his duties. In these last two cases, it refers to a reputation directed towards a specific clientele, whether real or potential, but built on the absence of identification with its opposite: The mafioso who does his job well is expected to have no problem breaking the law; from the efficient bureaucrat one would expect that "his product" is not inefficiency or request of bribes. For this reason, they both have different clienteles. And the same goes, in general terms, for professions:
A lawyer who does not know how to defend has no future. like Coronel and Garay, who offer a quality product: the guarantee of protection.
Stealing Vehicles: Forms of Protection
How exactly do the police protect criminals? After showing that there is police specialization regarding sale of protection to criminals, I will next try to show the specific forms of protection the police sell. I will examine the forms of protection offered and what the conditions for sale are, using the market for stolen vehicles in Buenos Aires as a reference point. I must warn the reader that, in this section, the information provided about this market is fragmentary. In addition, there is a complete absence of investigation on the subject due to the fact that, as it happens with the mafia, everything we know is a consequence of those cases in which business problems arose. When there is a good understanding between the police and the criminals -as there is most of the time -nothing is recorded and, therefore, we know nothing about it.
From the information gathered, it can be stated that the protection adopts three specific forms. The common denominator of all of these is administrative tampering. In the following, the three forms of protection will be described, and finally, I will provide an example of bureaucratic tampering.
Arrest and release: Arresting people for legal or illegal reasons to collect a sum of money for the release of the prisoner is the most common form of sale of protection. People who committed crimes -for example, criminals with arrest warrants 66 -as well as others who did not -in general, known criminals -are arrested to charge them for their release, either for cash or for part of the loot. 67 This form is related to the recruitment of teenagers and the supply of police protection so they can commit crimes. But even though the logic of arrest-release or its derivative, recruitment, are widespread forms of sale of protection, they reach their limit with the emergence of conflicts. Indeed, deaths of young men in alleged confrontations with the police seem to be a consequence of the breach of the informal contractual relationship between the police and their clients. is an effective mechanism of sale of protection that stimulates the operation of the three main criminal markets in Buenos Aires. In these cases, the protection will cover fixed targets, such as "kitchens" or places to store cocaine, chop shops, etc., or moving targets such as people or vehicles. 69 In any of the cases, the protection requires an exhaustive knowledge of the territory as well as a certain degree of logistic coordination. Supervision Officer Carlos expressed that "the person who gives the order to release an area at a specific time and street is the officer on duty or the chief officer".
Informants:
The protection for informants is another form of sale of protection used to gain interests -economic or of prestige -as well as to regulate the markets. In an insecure world such as the criminal one, quality information is a precious commodity. Because of that, there are enough reasons for criminals to trade information in exchange for protection and/or money. Meanwhile, the police have the possibility of benefiting economically or of gaining prestige if they manage to intercept valuable information. An example of the latter are the chief officers who buy information related to drug cargoes -coming from other provinces or bordering countries -and with it they organize drug seizures that, due to widespread media interest, earn them promotions or awards.
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These three forms of illegal protection could not be marketed without administrativebureaucratic mechanisms that allow for its invisibility. Releasing areas, the "arrest-release" of people, and informant protection all require constant tampering with records or submitting certificates intended to conceal multiple irregularities that occurred during the protection sale. Consequently, the legal system considered in broad terms is an essential component when absorbing the demands of illegality and maintaining a legal appearance of police actions. This stage, however, is not reached with police participation alone. In many of the documents I was able to access, it can be verified that the acquisition of certificates, authori- wrecked cars with car ownership papers in public auctions. First, the buyers of the wrecked vehicle will sell it again as scrap and then they will start to search for -and steal -a vehicle with the same characteristics to the one that will be cloned with the papers of the purchased car. Finally, they will have a "new" vehicle that may be sold as a remis (fixed-fare taxi) in
Greater Buenos Aires or as spare parts. can be clearly seen in these documents that the protection becomes administrative cover-upthat is to say, drawing up documents that state that, after the police inspection, there is "nothing unusual to report".
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Furthermore, the concrete forms of protection are inseparable from its sale conditions.
Just like insurance companies, policemen who sell illegal protection also stipulate the conditions of the contract. The protector ensures that there are tolerable risk margins. These conditions prove essential during the process of protection sale and determine who will be able to purchase it. Supervision Officer Carlos and former minister Arslanián agree, in a different way, that there are two conditions for sale: profitability and the media impact of the business.
If there are no profits that encourage risk-taking and if the possibilities of the media becoming aware of it are too high, the conditions for the sale of protection are not met. They are exclusive to one another. For that reason, Supervision Officer Carlos has mentioned the tendency among policemen to avoid working with paqueados (those who use cocaine paste).
When working with them -especially during car thefts -there are risks of murders being committed 74 and that may lead to public protests or the intervention of the mass media. This could also happen with kidnappings for ransom. 75 Former minister Arslanián expressed that during his administration, police stations were found to have under their jurisdiction the same number -exactly -of stolen cars. The reason for this was that a larger number of thefts could decrease the tolerance of insurance companies and raise media awareness. 76 Interview with Arslanián.
Conclusion
The state weakness, long-lasting and widespread, that several Latin American countries display, has its origin in sectors within those states. Social groupings or specific constellations of players located in the heart of the weak state are characterized by its strength and resistance to reforms, but also for extending the above-mentioned weakness. This paper has demonstrated that a clear example of this is the conduct of the police of the province of Buenos Aires. The police prevent a suitable standard of law enforcement from being reached when performing their duties because they sell illegal protection.
The phenomenon of protection sale to criminals provided by the police has demanded an important theoretical distinction. My analysis of police protection differs from that of Charles
Tilly because Tilly states that protection is a product offered by the state to the citizens in exchange for those resources that would allow the consolidation of the state power. Far from being a product supplied only to those who contribute resources by following legally established paths, police protection is also sold to those who work in drug-trafficking, vehicle theft and human-trafficking. Nor is it a case of sale of protection, like the one described by
Diego Gambetta in his analysis of the Sicilian Mafia. However, the police maintain the status of state organization and prevent it from operating as mafia organizations. Illegal police protection is, for that reason, a third form of protection with the main characteristic of being a shield against the law. This non-enforcement or temporary suspension of the law can be marketed only by a state agency whose behaviour resembles the one that Gambetta attributes to the mafia.
We are in the presence of a state that, at least presently, sells protection twice: to citizens and to criminals -to players whose interests are the exact opposite. The risk that this implies for policemen and politicians is tolerated because of the profitability that the aforementioned businesses offer. Several quoted interviewees refer to the serious financial problems of the police force as well as the need of politicians to finance their political campaigns. These budgetary deficits together with institutionalized corruption cause the sale of what the police decide daily: whether they will enforce the law or not.
From this thesis, two theoretical contributions and one question arise. The first contribution refers to the widespread thesis according to which the presence of bribes (graft) indicates that the police force cannot ensure the policemen's obedience. Throughout this paper, I
have demonstrated how the sale of protection is not only to the benefit of the policemen, who obtain additional economic benefits, but also to the financial support of the police force.
The activity of selling protection supports the force because it decisively contributes to the financing of the police stations and the day-to-day police duties, and also because it is a mechanism that -as Darden observes in the Ukrainian bureaucracy -reinforces hierarchies and makes obedience possible. That is to say, in this case, bribe (graft) does not generate weakness, but rather strength. The second contribution refers to the assumption that the sale of protection, commonly known as "police corruption", leads to a loss of police/state control over crime. When denying the operational capability of certain criminal gangs or crooks, it must be pointed out that the protection sale is an informal mechanism to regulate crime and, therefore, a control for it. Police territorial deployment -even when it is logistically precarious -and its ability for extortion allow a maintenance of an asymmetrical relationship towards the individuals or groups that operate in illegality. The question arises from the way of relating to criminals -especially the ones that are organized -which is established by means of selling illegal police protection. As was already mentioned, the sale of protection allows a control or informal regulation of crime that can be maintained as long as there is police superiority. Whether, in the long run, the protection sale stimulates the progressive operational autonomy of criminal organizations and eliminates the asymmetry of power between the police force and organized criminal groups remains an open question.
